University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 2021

Article 7

2021

Lochner Under Lockdown
Eugene Kontorovich

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kontorovich, Eugene (2021) "Lochner Under Lockdown," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2021,
Article 7.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2021/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Chicago Legal Forum by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Lochner Under Lockdown
Eugene Kontorovich†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1905, the Supreme Court rendered two landmark decisions on
the scope of individual liberty—Jacobson v. Massachusetts1 and Lochner v. New York.2 The first denied a substantive due process claim and
has become the legal bedrock of all judicial examinations of public
health measures ever since (and is the go-to citation of contemporary
COVID-19 cases). The other upheld a substantive due process claim—
and was thrown in the dustbin of constitutional history, known now
only as part of the “anticanon.”3 Yet to address the broad restrictions on
liberty caused by current and foreseeable pandemic responses, it is
worth noting that the Lochner Court is the Jacobson Court and that the
cases were decided within months of each other.4 The latter’s broad deference to public health authority lived side-by-side with a broader conception of individual liberty. At a time when state police power has imposed unprecedented limitations on individuals’ ability to provide for
themselves in dignity, Lochner should be brought out of lockdown.
***
The overarching story of substantive due process in the twentieth
century was the rejection of economic rights as fundamental, followed
by a recognition of unenumerated rights largely in the area of reproduction and sexuality. One explanation for this trajectory could simply be
a deeper social understanding of what is important in life. But another
view would suggest that the Court believed basic economic rights to be
largely safe from legislative encroachment. From the late 1940s on, it
seemed increasingly unlikely that the United States would go the way
of Eastern Europe, embracing economic doctrines that fundamentally
†

Professor of Law, George Mason University Scalia Law School.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
2
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3
See Jamal Green, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011).
4
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (“The other day we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination
law.” (citing Jacobson)).
1
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reified the power of the state over the individual. It was not generally
thought that the freedom of contract would be suppressed or interfered
with as thoroughgoingly, as say, abortions. The shift parallels, perhaps
not accidentally, the shift in progressive intellectuals’ emphasis from
economic rights to ones of autonomy and identity. As Marcuse put it,
rapidly increasing standards of living (“freedom from want, the concrete
substance of all freedom”) reduced the public salience of “freedom of enterprise,” while inhibiting true autonomy and spirit of humans, which
required, inter alia, sexual liberation.5
The government response to the COVID-19 pandemic has changed
all that. In a matter of weeks, across the country, entire industries were
shut down indefinitely, and often fatally. State and local shut-down and
social distancing orders have prohibited contractual relations on a scale
previously unimagined. By means of illustration, the unemployment
rate during 2020 rose to its highest levels since official measurement
began—due to a combination of private avoidance behaviors and government fiat.6 The broad closures and lockdowns that are characteristic
of governments’ COVID-19 responses, and will likely characterize responses to future pandemics, are unprecedented. As will be discussed
below, even in the vastly more virulent Spanish Flu pandemic,7 state
governments did not implement blanket closures of businesses. Similarly radical was the federal mandate, formulated nearly two years after the start of the pandemic, making the COVID-19 vaccine an actual
or de facto condition of employment for much of the nation’s workers.8
In the first several months of the pandemic, courts uniformly
turned away all constitutional challenges to lockdown measures. In
these early cases, courts expressed broad and uncritical deference to
emergency measures responding to the novel pandemic. Yet as closures

5

HEBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 1–2 (1964).
6
GENE FALK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC 2 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLY8L3UC].
7
By some estimates, the Spanish Flu was four times deadlier than COVID-19—that is, an
infected person had a four times greater chance of dying. Moreover, the Spanish Flu resulted in a
far greater loss of life-years because it overwhelmingly struck the young. Daihai He et al., Comparing COVID-19 and the 1918–19 Influenza Pandemics in the United Kingdom, 98 INT’L J.
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
67,
68
(2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.06.075
[https://perma.cc/48GY-T9Q2].
8
This Essay was written before President Biden announced on Sept. 9, 2021 a series of vaccine mandates that extend the great majority of American workers. While the focus of this Essay
is on business closures and similar restrictions, they are also relevant to such sweeping vaccine
mandates, though unlike closure orders, the effects of the fomer are conditional on non-vaccination.
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wore on,9 courts began striking down closure and distancing rules when
they impacted particular individual rights—political protests,10 communal prayer,11 travel restrictions,12 gun purchases,13 and abortion services.14 For such rights, courts have resumed their strict scrutiny of restrictions, examining their evidentiary basis, the availability of less
burdensome alternatives, and so forth.
Yet, while courts have been willing to “second guess” public health
determinations when faced with certain kinds of individual rights
claims,15 such litigation has only nibbled around the edges of the regulations’ liberty-restricting effects. While a growing number of plaintiffs
have won relief from restrictions on communal prayer,16 by far the
9

Compare Ramsek v. Beshear, 468 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918 (E.D. Ky. 2020), appeal dismissed
as moot and remanded, 989 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that Kentucky’s ban on any outdoor
protests with more than ten people violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to try to preserve free assembly interests, as evidenced by the fact that “the Commonwealth
has required implementation of [social distancing, masking and related measures] in places like
restaurants, office buildings, and auctions, but continues to wholly prohibit gatherings for political
protest above a set number no matter the circumstance”), with Givens v. Newsom, 459 F. Supp. 3d
1302, 1314 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (upholding a challenge to a blanket moratorium on protests at the
state Capitol).
10
See generally, e.g., Ramsek, 468 F. Supp. 3d 904.
11
The increasing scrutiny that regulations have faced as closures have stretched on for
months can be seen in the Supreme Court’s growing willingness to strike down limits on communal
prayer. Compare S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), with S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021). See also Ramsek, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 918; Capitol
Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, 496 F. Supp. 3d 284, 299 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Now months into this
public health crisis, the District has had the opportunity to determine with greater particularity
the risks presented by COVID-19 and the restrictions necessary; sweeping justifications perhaps
more suitable to the early stages of a public health crisis will not suffice.”).
12
See Roberts v. Neace, 457 F. Supp. 3d 595, 603 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (“Not only is there a lack of
procedural due process with respect to the Travel Ban, but the above examples show that these
travel regulations are not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s purpose.”).
13
Conn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 465 F. Supp. 3d 56, 73 (D. Conn. 2020) (holding
that, despite the “principles of deference and even granting the wisdom of the decisions of the
Governor and the Commissioner to great deference to the protective measures ordered by government officials in response to the COVID-19 crisis,” the imposing of stricter social distancing rules
on gun licensing requirements than on “hair salons and barber shops” impermissibly burdens Second Amendment rights), appeal docketed, No. 20-2078 (2d Cir. July 1, 2020); Lynchburg Range &
Training v. Northam, 105 Va. Cir. 159 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2020) (striking down Virginia’s ban on indoor
gun ranges under a mixture of federal constitutional and state statutory grounds).
14
See, e.g., Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he burdens on
abortion created by the state’s initial interpretations of the March 27 and April 3 orders far exceeded the orders’ benefits in combatting the COVID-19 epidemic.”); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 926 (6th Cir. 2020) (granting a preliminary injunction against a three-week
moratorium on certain abortions, on the grounds that the dangers posed to medical personnel were
based on the “State’s say-so”), vacated sub nom. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262
(2021).
15
See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 79 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
16
This is not to say that communal prayer is inherently less important than the ability to
work at one’s job. Rather, the desire for communal prayer in forms not allowed by state closure
orders is likely relevant to fewer people than the desire for remunerative work. Moreover, for most
people one’s work, and pay that comes from it, is a central part of their lives, and generally more
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broadest and greatest impact of the COVID-19 regulations on peoples’
lives—on their ability to work—has largely remained outside the realm
of constitutional scrutiny. The shuttering of broad swaths of commerce
has led to many constitutional challenges by affected businesses, but
these have been extraordinarily unsuccessful.17 Only two federal court
decisions have thus far enjoined closure measures in challenges brought
by affected business owners—and were promptly stayed by appellate
courts.18 State courts have,19 with one obscure exception,20 been similarly unreceptive.21
The very mention of substantive economic rights in these cases has
been shocking to some scholars.22 Challenges to business closures have
a hard time getting off the ground because, in the post-Lochner world,
economic liberty claims are thought to not enjoy heightened constitutional protection.23
***
This Essay will argue that whatever Lochner’s failings, the rationales for abandoning “freedom of contract” as against economic regulation are largely inapplicable to the current COVID-19 restrictions. This
important than religion. See Where Americans Find Meaning in Life, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 20,
2018),
https://www.pewforum.org/2018/11/20/where-americans-find-meaning-in-life/
[https://perma.cc/X3W3-YFWT].
17
See Jeffrey Thaler, The Next Surges Are Here: What Can American Governments Lawfully
Do In Response to the Ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic?, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. POL’Y &
PRAC. 165, 208–09 nn.154–57 (2020) (collecting cases).
18
See Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883 (W.D. Pa. 2020), stay granted, No. 20-2936,
2020 WL 5868393 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2020); League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v.
Whitmer, 468 F. Supp. 3d 940, 952 (W.D. Mich. 2020), stay granted, 814 F. App’x. 125 (6th Cir.
2020).
19
See, e.g., Desrosiers v. Governor, 158 N.E.3d 827, 844 (Mass. 2020) (finding closure orders
that permitted the reopening of casinos but not arcades were not so arbitrary as to violate substantive due process, in part because “the right to work is not a fundamental right that receives
strict scrutiny”); Cnty. of Los Angeles Dep’t of Pub. Health v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 61
Cal. App. 5th 478, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (rejecting substantive due process claim against order
prohibiting restaurants from having outdoor dining), reh’g denied (Mar. 12, 2021), review denied
(June 9, 2021).
20
See Lasertron, Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 138 N.Y.S.3d 844, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)
(finding plaintiff laser-tag operator’s due process rights were violated when it was closed although
state officials “could not (or would not) answer why certain indoor activities were permitted and
others, like Lasertron, were not”).
21
See, e.g., Midway Venture LLC v. County. of San Diego, 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 412 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2021) (vacating lower court injunction against order closing nude dancing establishment that
also served food), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 8, 2021).
22
See, e.g., Paul Gowder, The Dangers to the American Rule of Law Will Outlast the Next
Election, 2020 CARDOZO L. REV. DE-NOVO 126, 157 (2020) (“To a member of the left-leaning side of
the legal profession, [Wolf] is truly astonishing.”).
23
See, e.g., Desrosiers, 158 N.E.3d at 844 (“To the extent the plaintiffs argue that operating a
business [is] . . . burdened by the emergency orders, these arguments do not subject the emergency
orders to strict scrutiny. The right to work is not a fundamental right that receives strict scrutiny.”), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Desrosiers v. Baker, No. 20-1569 (U.S. May 12, 2021).
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Essay does not argue that the COVID-19 response has been constitutionally unwarranted. A revival of Lochner would not call into question
all or even many closure orders, as a wide variety of economic legislation of far more dubious necessity than the pandemic response was upheld in the Lochner era,24 and courts today have stressed that the pandemic is a compelling, rather than merely plausible, government
interest.25 Indeed, Jacobson, which sustained a mandatory vaccination
program, was decided by the Lochner Court and was framed against a
backdrop of broad and unenumerated Fourteenth Amendment liberty.
Rather, this Essay urges that, in a post-Lochner world, we lack the constitutional language to deal with the potential danger to liberty implicated by such impositions on peoples’ freedoms.26 At the same time, the
Jacobson/Lochner juxtaposition demonstrates that taking work-related
liberties seriously does not mean jettisoning deep deference to public
health measures, especially during infectious emergencies.
Lochner is heavily criticized as an attempt by the Court to secondguess legislative judgements about economic policy and redistribution.
But this Essay will argue that at least a more modest and more focused
version of the Lochner doctrine is much better suited to traditional police power measures (such as health and safety) that nonetheless have
significant effects on people’s ability to pursue their callings and support themselves. (Lochner itself was the opposite—an economic regulation dressed up as public health measure.) The need for a mechanism
of constitutional scrutiny is particularly acute when, as with COVID19, a set of early emergency public health orders are repeatedly renewed, leading to devastating economic effects.27 Since the start of the
epidemic, well over 100,000 businesses have closed. For most of these,
a variety of economic factors will likely prevent reopening.28 For these
businesses, the temporary has become the permanent.29 Nor does the
24

See David Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q.
1469, 1505–07 (2005).
25
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (“Stemming the spread
of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.”).
26
Even in one outlier case where an appellate court has called into question to overall effect
COVID-19 emergency measures on unenumerated liberties, it was through the vehicle of state
separation of powers doctrine. See Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 912 (Wis. 2020)
(holding that the state non-delegation doctrine prevents a cabinet member from unilaterally issuing emergency orders “even at the expense of fundamental liberties”).
27
See Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, 496 F. Supp. 3d 284, 297 (D.D.C. 2020) (suggesting that judicial review should distinguish between the initial “onset” period of a public health
emergency and its regularization, when the “crisis stops being temporary, and as days and weeks
turn to months and years, the [constitutional] slack in the leash eventually runs out”).
28
Lisa Fickenscher, Nearly 60 Percent of COVID-19 Business Closures are Permanent: Report,
N.Y. POST (Sept. 17, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/09/17/majority-of-covid-19-business-closuresare-permanent-report/ [https://perma.cc/R8QY-2CW9].
29
See generally S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2021) (statement
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“temporary” nature of burdens on constitutional interests, even economic ones, make them less real.30
Previous emergencies—World War I and, even more so, World War
II—saw governments around the world extend broad and sometimes
near-dictatorial powers over the economy. Some countries, like the
United States, chose to move away from most of these policies after the
war.31 Others, like Argentina, did not. The point here is that emergency
measures with significant effects on individuals’ ability to contract
freely can easily persist beyond the emergency, especially when there
is no constitutional counterweight. Indeed, at least one state has already taken steps to institutionalize parts of its emergency regulations.32
To police against such dangers—and not necessarily to strike down
business closures today—some rehabilitation of Lochner is needed. For
marketing purposes, however, it likely needs another name. For present
purposes, “little Lochner” will do. Part II of this Essay will demonstrate
most rationales for repudiating Lochner do not necessarily preclude any
liberty-based challenge to closure laws. Part III shows that the present
closure measures are different enough in scope and purpose from the
regulations dealt with under the Lochner Doctrine to potentially warrant a different result. It also shows how COVID-19 restrictions are
fundamentally different from any prior peacetime government
of Gorsuch, J.) (“As this crisis enters its second year—and hovers over a second Lent, a second
Passover, and a second Ramadan—it is too late for the State to defend extreme measures with
claims of temporary exigency, if it ever could.”).
30
See, e.g., First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (“‘[T]emporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation.”).
31
Even in the United States, vestiges of the wartime regulatory system survive until this day.
New York’s rent control regime began with federal regulation of prices justified by a broad interpretation of the War Power. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944) (“A nation
which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging of that war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control on the domestic front which will assure each
landlord a ‘fair return’ on his property.”); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 143–44
(1948) (holding that rent controls can be implemented years after the conclusion of hostilities because the “effects” of the war were still felt). Interestingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has also seen
federal housing regulation, this time as a public health measure, rather than a wartime one. Today
the measures take the form of repeatedly extended eviction moratoria. See Tiger Lilly v. Dep’t
Housing & Urb. Dev., 992 F.3d 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that the CDC’s moratorium
or evictions for non-payment of rent exceeded the agency’s statutory authority); Terkel v. Ctrs. For
Disease Control & Prevention, No. 6:20-CV-00564, 2021 WL 742877, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25,
2021) (holding that the CDC eviction moratorium violated the Commerce Clause), appeal docketed,
No. 21-40137 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2021).
32
See Taylor DesOrmeau, Michigan’s Push for Permanent Covid-19 Rules Sparks Battle with
Business Leaders, M LIVE (May 17, 2021), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2021/05/michigans-push-for-permanent-covid-19-rules-sparks-battle-with-business-leaders.html
[https://perma.cc/SE3W-WERX].
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measures—including in pandemics. The unprecedentedly broad powers
exercised by governments calls for judicial scrutiny and illustrates why
a constitutional liberty interest in work is normatively attractive. Part
III discusses the limited scope of such an interest. It concludes by showing that recognizing a limited liberty interest in such circumstances
would not only limit judicial authority to second-guess public health determinations but would also likely leave most COVID-19 restrictions in
place.
II. THE LIMITED REPUDIATION OF LOCHNER
This Part will examine whether existing doctrine, and in particular
the famous repudiation of the Lochner line of cases, entirely precludes
the kind of “little Lochner” doctrine that might enable liberty-based
challenges to broad business closure orders to at least withstand a motion to dismiss. Despite the consignment of Lochner itself to the “anticanon,” its doctrinal underpinning, substantive due process, has not
been repudiated and indeed has been revived.33 This has led to an extensive discussion of what Lochner’s mistake was. Under many understandings of Lochner, its error and, thus, the reasons for its repudiation
would not preclude “liberty” based challenges to public health lockdown
rules, even when the harm asserted is economic.
Substantive due process is the idea that there are certain government actions that weigh so heavily on individual liberty that almost no
amount of “process” can justify them. In part because enumerated
rights are historically contingent, they cannot exhaust the list of enormities the government might inflict on citizens. The Lochner Court saw
a broad doctrine of freedom of contract as one such essential liberty: the
ability to provide for oneself is what makes all other enumerated rights
possible, from buying a newspaper, to tithing for a church, to purchasing firearms. As has been widely noted, the sexual autonomy cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut34 have shown that substantive
due process has not been abandoned by the Court. Rather, one “substance” has been replaced with another. Thus, what was wrong with
Lochner, in the conventional account, was its understanding of economic liberties as fundamental ones that must be protected beyond enumeration.35
It could be that the broadest criticism is correct—that any kind of
substantive due process lacks constitutional basis. In this view, Lochner

33

Substantive due process rights have been successfully invoked against COVID-19 closure
orders even in the early days of the pandemic. See cases cited supra note 11.
34
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992).
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is as misguided as cases that are far from anticanonical, such as Roe v.
Wade36 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 In this view, substantive
due process is an empty set, and abstract concepts of “liberty” should
not be a reason to set aside legislative enactments. Under this understanding, there would be no basis in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause to challenge business closures.38
However, most academic accounts of Lochner’s error do not throw
out the entire substantive due process baby with the baking-regulation
bathwater—and thereby leave room for at least some liberty interest
adequate enough to contest, if not set aside, broad business closure orders. Most accounts of Lochner’s sin point to narrower errors than believing in unenumerated “liberties.”
Some simply contend that “freedom of contract” is not a fundamental or essential liberty. Instead, the correct ones are a cluster of rights
that intersect with concepts of autonomy and sexuality, such as abortion and contraception. The right not to quarter soldiers is little consolation if policemen can nonetheless pop in to monitor one’s sexual acts;
indeed, the latter may be the greater intrusion.39 The common justification for this is that the sexual autonomy rights, unlike economic ones,
are “fundamental or integral to personhood, autonomy, or equal concern
and respect.”40 In this view, Lochner’s error was not in protecting unenumerated rights as being essential to liberty but in protecting the
wrong rights. Yet work and compensation are, at least today, central to
people’s lives, ranked second after family in surveys.41 Work can be a
form of self-actualization and a means of obtaining funds to pursue
other means of self-actualization. Thus, this understanding of Lochner’s
mistake does not do full justice to the interests implicated by prolonged
business closures.

36

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
38
Many of the proponents of this position, however, believe that not only that Lochner and
Roe were wrongly decided, but the Slaughter-House Cases as well, and see a role for the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause to do some of the work of unenumerated
rights. The understanding of Privileges and Immunities as limiting legislative power to give special treatment to favored businesses would be particularly powerful as applied to lockdown regulations with multiple classes of favored and disfavored businesses, but is not pursued in this essay.
39
See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (finding that the Constitution protects a constellation of
privacy-preserving rights, such as the ban on quartering, and that the “penumbras” of these rights
extend to marital privacy).
40
James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 147, 164 (1999).
41
Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (observing that sexual conduct is important
in part because it is instrumental to achieving other meaningful things in life such as an “enduring” romantic relationship).
37
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Relatedly, Professor Fleming suggests another understanding of
the repudiation of Lochner—that, while economic liberties are genuine
and important, they should not be aggressively enforced by courts because economic regulation does not typically undermine preconditions
for democratic deliberation or trigger “distrust” of legislative motives in
sense meant by John Hart Ely.42 This rationale does not obviously apply
to sweeping business closure orders that eliminate entire livelihoods.
One might think that the government’s ability to prevent millions from
working and make them dependent on government aid could also affect
their ability to participate in democracy. Democratic participation can
be undermined by both increasing direct costs (i.e., poll taxes), which is
unconstitutional, and perhaps through indirect costs (i.e., inconvenient
polling places and times). It would stand to reason that reducing people’s ability to bear any costs could undermine their energy and interest
in politics.
The Casey plurality emphasized that Lochner was based on mistaken “factual assumptions” that “relatively unregulated” markets can
“satisfy even minimum levels of human welfare.”43 But as scholars have
shown, this caricatures the Lochner Court, which accepted a fair degree
of economic regulation.44 Furthermore, the characterization of Lochner
offered by the Casey Court does little to explain why such a doctrine
should not be used to evaluate long-term COVID-19 business closures.
Unlike the measures sometimes struck down by the Lochner Court, the
current rules cannot be described as mere market regulation. They often involve the closure of business altogether and are not undertaken
in the name of economic policy.
Other objections to Lochner stem not from a rejection of the notion
of economic liberty, but rather the view that courts’ supervision of economic regulation would essentially come down to checking legislatures’
economic theories against their own. Economic policy, as Cass Sunstein45 and the Casey majority put it,46 cannot presuppose a baseline of
a perfectly functioning free market. The “freedom of contract” that
Lochner presumed, in this account, is of an equal bargaining position
between the bakery owner and his employees. In this critique, an unrealistic view of the market was imposed by the Court to limit fairly minor
42

See Fleming, supra note 40, at 172.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992).
44
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins
of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 n.24 (2003) (collecting cases).
45
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987) (“We may thus understand Lochner as a case that failed because it selected, as the baseline for constitutional analysis, a system that was state-created, hardly neutral, and without prepolitical status.”).
46
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 862 (holding that Lochner was overruled because “the facts of economic life were different from those previously assumed”).
43
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adjustments in the employer-employee relationship designed to redress
colorable market imperfections.47 The bakers in New York were allowed
to work long hours—just not more than sixty a week.
One need not embrace the sweeping “absolute” doctrine of Lochner
to admit a liberty interest in a right to pursue one’s calling. Indeed,
some state constitutions already continue to recognize a liberty interest
in such matters.48 Unlike the laws at issue in Lochner-era cases, a closure order does not relate to the conditions on which labor may be sold,
but rather on whether it can be sold at all. Closure orders have entirely
barred or made unsustainable otherwise lawful callings. For those not
deemed “essential,” the inability to work in a job they had trained for,
practiced, and invested in has a potentially vast impact on their identity
and life that may persist long after the measures have been repealed. A
person’s job is the single largest component of their day, a central part
of their life. The liberty interest implicated by COVID-19 measures is
not Lochner’s radical freedom of contract but rather something that
may better be described as a right to pursue one’s occupation, which has
a significant pre-Lochner pedigree.49 Being prohibited from one’s work
can carry with it a loss of purpose, depression, and a fundamental reordering of one’s life.50 Contemporary substantive due process doctrine
recognizes that “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”51
As a doctrinal matter, Lochner’s demise need not categorically preclude such challenges. Lochner dealt with commonplace economic regulation, based on debatable views of economic policy, which merely adjusted around the edges of the great web of contractual relationships
47

As numerous scholars have noted, this characterization, based on the facts of Lochner itself,
fails to account for much of the “Lochner era,” in which the Court upheld most economic regulation
and intervened primarily when there was a suggestion of special interest maneuvering behind
restrictions on business. The law at issue in Lochner, for example, was pushed through by largely
unionized German immigrant bakers to limit the competitive advantage of mostly non-German,
non-unionized immigrant bakers. See Bernstein, supra note 24, at 1476–81.
48
Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015) (“[T]he standard of
review for as-applied substantive due course challenges to economic regulation statutes includes
an accompanying consideration . . . : whether the statute’s effect as a whole is so unreasonably
burdensome that it becomes oppressive in relation to the underlying governmental interest.”).
49
See John Hart Ely, “To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation”: The Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 952–4 (2006); see
also David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A Brighter Future
Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 287, 299–301 (2016) (arguing that a right to pursue an occupation is not
just an economic interest, but involves aspects of personal self-realization and autonomy, and may
have more appeal to the contemporary Supreme Court).
50
See Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87 (Tex. 2015) (Willet, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to put your
mind and body to productive enterprise, is not a mere luxury to be enjoyed at the sufferance of
governmental grace, but is indispensable to human dignity and prosperity.”).
51
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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that are made possible by organized government, and might thus be
regulated by government. Even during the pandemic, some unenumerated “liberty” interests not recognized by the Lochner Court have afforded protection against COVID-19 closure orders.52 It is not doctrinally unthinkable—though certainly not clearly provided for in existing
constitutional doctrine—to suggest that novel government prohibitions
on doing business in general could implicate a right to pursue an occupation. To borrow a phrase from Casey, workers’ and business owners’
“ability to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability”53 to work in otherwise lawful
professions even if not deemed “essential” by the state.
III. VIABLE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS THEORIES POST-LOCHNER
A. The Difference Between Economic Regulation and Wholesale Closure Orders
The abandonment of Lochner does not necessarily preclude substantive due process challenges in the context of broad business closure
orders that are distinguishable in important ways from the issues at
play in cases of hours and wages regulation. Assuming, as current law
does, that due process provides protection against extreme deprivations
of liberty, then depending on what Lochner’s mistake was, Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to business closures should not be entirely precluded. The vast level of control state governments have taken over
daily economic life during the pandemic is unprecedented and reveals a
need for a recognition of some liberty interest in the ability to pursue a
calling.
One reason to think that the abandonment of Lochner should not
entirely preclude Fourteenth Amendment challenges to business closure orders is that the nature of the liberty interest the business owners
assert against COVID-19 closures is quite different from the interest in
Lochner. When the Court overruled the Lochner doctrine in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,54 it claimed that those cases embodied a doctrine of
“absolute freedom of contract.”55 Yet, as Justice Holmes explained in his
famous dissent from the Lochner Court’s jurisprudence, involving a case
where the majority struck down a federal minimum wage law for
women, contractual relations are already limited by a wide variety of

52
53
54
55

See cases cited supra note 14.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 406.
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regulatory provisions whose constitutionality seems well-settled.56
Hours and wages regulation added just another layer.
Lochner’s maximum hours regulation limited some bakers’ business at the margins (and did not affect many other bakers at all). In
overruling it, the Court emphasized the businesses must necessarily
submit to many regulations on the manner and conditions in which they
conduct themselves. So perhaps the problem with the Lochner doctrine
policing laws that tweaked around the edges of contracts was that,
given the ubiquity of regulation, there is no clear, non-ideological principle for accepting some but not all.
Alternatively, if Lochner’s mistake was judicial second-guessing of
economic policy, it tells us little about shutdown orders, which in no
way seek to make economic policy. Stay-at-home orders and lockdowns
are not based on any theory of labor relations, market structure, or
other economic theory. Yet shutdown orders, more than most economic
regulations, impinge on people’s ability to make a living. To put it another way, scale matters. West Coast Hotel’s rejection of a liberty of contract does not necessarily govern in the current circumstances because
the breadth of governmental assertions of power over people’s livelihoods is unprecedented.
B. The Difference Between the Public Health Response to COVID-19
and Prior Pandemics
COVID-19 is not the first public health menace since the adoption
of the Constitution. Nor is it the first pandemic—the 1918 Spanish Flu,
the study of which heavily informed government contingency planning
for such emergencies—was considerably worse in its lethality, with case
fatality rates in excess of 2.5 percent.57 The virus was also respiratory
and transmissible through close contact. Public health authorities responded in many ways we would find familiar today: school closures,
mask mandates, and calls for social distancing.58 While many cities
shuttered mass gathering places (churches, saloons, theaters, and
dance halls), a general closure of business was not implemented in almost any jurisdiction.59 The most aggressive measures were regulating
56

Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568–69 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing
Sunday closure laws, insurance rate regulation, mining regulation, bread-loaf size regulation and
other measures that restrict freedom of contract).
57
See generally JOHN BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PANDEMIC IN HISTORY (2005).
58
See ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 (2d ed.
2003).
59
See Robert Barro, Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions and Mortality in US Cities During the
Great Influenza Pandemic, 1918–19 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27,409,
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business hours with curfews or staggered shifts in factories60—closer to
the measures in question in Lochner than to the current pandemic response.
Several comprehensive studies of health measures adopted across
the United States during the Spanish Flu reveal that, even in the most
proactive jurisdictions, closures of ordinary retail businesses were offlimits.61 The benefits of reducing human interaction to reduce transmission were well understood, and it is unclear whether such measures
were not considered solely because of the economic effects, or because
of some constitutional scruple.
The lack of general closures is ironic given that twenty-first-century studies of the “non-pharmaceutical interventions” adopted during
the 1918 Spanish Flu were quite influential in formulating the response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the relative success of a combination of measures, such as masking and closures of mass gathering
places, led public health scientists in 2020 to emphasize “[e]arly, layered, and long” interventions.62 But the nature or “thickness” of the closure “layer” of intervention does not seem to have been informed by the
1918 experience.
The history of public health response is particularly relevant because the public health experts take the 1918 Spanish Flu response as
a general model for thinking about contemporary pandemic response,
including COVID-19. Governmental planning for a new pandemic had
in recent decades taken the Spanish Flu as an explicit model or principal case. Notably, such plans did not contemplate mandatory business
closures at all, and instead dealt only briefly and warily with optional
“snow days.”63 In other words, in the years prior to COVID-19, pandemic
planners saw the response to the 1918 Spanish Flu as a model.
Yet the COVID-19 response unexpectedly departed from the script
by using blanket business closure orders. These measures, adopted
early by the West Coast states, were apparently mimicking China’s and

2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27049/w27049.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UW43-GN5B].
60
Id.
61
Howard Markel et al., Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During
the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, 298 JAMA 644, 646–48 (2007); Richard J. Hatchett et al., Public Health Interventions and Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, 104 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7582, 7583 (2007).
62
Lawrence
Wright,
The
Plague
Year,
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-year [https://perma.cc/822X-GFPH].
63
See THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL 108
(2006), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VZ4K-LL8U] (“How long and how effectively snow day restrictions can be maintained has not been determined and thus the value of such restrictions has not been quantified.”).
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Italy’s handling of their COVID-19 outbreaks,64 though, of course, those
countries were not limited by the U.S. Constitution’s individual rights
doctrines. The point here is not to criticize the handling of the COVID19 pandemic but rather to highlight its radical departure from prior
practice, and perhaps prior imagination,65 of the scope, intensity, and
duration of government power over private business. This suggests that
the reversal of Lochner and its progeny by West Coast Hotel, based on a
view of the Court’s role in relation to economic regulation, should not
necessarily extend to broad circumscribing of people’s livelihoods in the
context of a public health response.
C. The Ability to Close Businesses Because they are Deemed “Unessential” Represents an Unprecedented Exercise of Government
Power, with Significant Potential for Arbitrariness
Broadly-worded public health laws have given governments extraordinary power to force people from their chosen occupations, destroy vast investment and reliance interests, and make millions dependent on government assistance. This is one of broadest exercises of
state power over individuals in the country’s history.66 Moreover, the
power to both shutter the economy and then exempt certain lines of
work as “essential,” or to issue individual exemptions, only exacerbates
the potential intrusion on liberty. In the COVID-19 dispensation, who
works and who does not is a discretionary determination by government
officials. To be sure, not all of the pandemic’s economic dislocation can
be attributed to government orders. Even in the absence of government
action, increased absenteeism, voluntary social distancing, consumer
uncertainty, and other factors would have resulted in the closure of
some businesses. But, presumably, voluntary avoidance would not have
the same effect because otherwise the closure orders would not have
been necessary.67
64

Vivian Ho, California: Millions Told to ‘Shelter in Place’ to Stop Spread of Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/california-coronavirus-shelter-in-place-bay-area [https://perma.cc/3L5U-3F6A].
65
See generally David Bell et al., Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza,
National and Community Measures, 12 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Jan. 2006, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov
/eid/article/12/1/05-1371_article [https://perma.cc/3BQZ-Z5GX] (describing current knowledge of
efficacy of masks, school closures and other measures to combat a severe global pandemic, but not
discussing broad business closures).
66
The only comparable regulations of similar reach, such as conscription and wartime rationing, were federal.
67
The question of whether a particular business’s losses are due to government closure orders
or the indirect effects of the pandemic arises frequently in the litigation of business interruption
insurance claims since the start of the pandemic. Insurers often claim, with considerable success,
that the policyholders’ losses are attributable to government orders, and thus do not constitute a
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The point about “essential” businesses bears emphasis. Even in the
first frantic wave of stay-at-home orders, some occupations were
deemed “essential”; this list would later expand. Many of these determinations have typically not been based on particular scientific
knowledge about what kind of work is more likely to spread contagion.
Often, they depend on competing intuitions or hunches, or perhaps competing interest group lobbying,68 rather than epidemiological data. Perhaps the most glaring example of this is the California restaurant that
could not even provide outdoor dining, while a huge catering tent serving hundreds was set up next door,69 due to the determination that the
entertainment industry was essential.70 Moreover, the determination of
a business being essential has typically not required it be “essential” in
the strict sense that perhaps would apply only to grocery stores and
pharmacies. For example, liquor and marijuana purveyors have been
allowed to stay open from the beginning almost everywhere.71 Allowing
marijuana sellers to continue their business while shuttering others
shows the vast state power implicit in “essential” designations, as marijuana remains a scheduled drug prohibited under federal law72 and,
until very recently, state law.
Politically influential professionals such as lawyers and members
of the media have enjoyed special dispensation, far broader than would
be required by the constitutional right to counsel or heightened protection for political speech. For example, the legal and media exceptions

“direct physical loss” as required by many policies. See Rachel E. Keen & Jonathan Reid Reich,
COVID-19 Shutdowns, Related Litigation Put Pressure on Business Interruption Insurers, NAT’L
L.J. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/covid-19-shutdowns-related-litigationput-pressure-business-interruption-insurers [https://perma.cc/473E-69S2].
68
Many states included exceptions for “labor union essential activities.” See, e.g., Essential
Business Operations, STATE OF IND. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.coronavirus.in.gov/2496.htm
[https://perma.cc/KG4J-RFV2].
69
Mary Meisenzahl, ‘A Slap in My Face’: LA Restaurant Owner’s Video Showing a Film
Shoot’s Catering Tent Set Up Next to Her Closed Eatery Goes Viral, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/foodanddrink/other/a-slap-in-my-face-la-restaurant-owners-videoshowing-a-film-shoots-catering-tent-set-up-next-to-her-closed-eatery-goes-viral/ar-BB1bI54v
[https://perma.cc/6D8Q-WJ3W].
70
STATE OF CAL., ESSENTIAL WORKFORCE 23 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://files.covid19.ca.gov/pdf
/EssentialCriticalInfrastructureWorkers.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9UU-67W3]; see also Lee Fang,
Hollywood Deployed Lobbyists to Win Exemptions to Strict California Lockdown, INTERCEPT (Dec.
11,
2020),
https://theintercept.com/2020/12/11/hollywood-covid-filming-california-lockdown/
[https://perma.cc/GZ4J-QZZW].
71
See Connie Lin, What is An ‘Essential’ Business Anyway? A Cheat Sheet for Getting Through
the COVID-19 Pandemic, FAST CO. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90484557/whatis-an-essential-business-anyway-a-cheat-sheet-for-getting-through-the-covid-19-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/J6JE-V4T3].
72
21 U.S.C § 812, Sched. I(c)(10) (2019).
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apply in full to entertainment lawyers73 and gossip reporters.74 Real estate services enjoyed special exemptions in some jurisdictions,75 even as
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention banned residential evictions on the theory the people moving around could spread the virus.76
All such professions may be essential in some sense, but not in the
sense of essential to keeping body and soul together, maintaining wartime production, or some other clear goal.77 Given the ubiquitous inclusion of liquor stores, “essential” is clearly not defined in relation to the
public health. Rather, they simply represent judgements about what
callings the government deems worthwhile or important based on considerations going far beyond the expertise of public health officials. The
greatest prior assertion of government authority over private individual
livelihoods was the Office of Price Administration, War Production
Board, and related agencies which had vast powers including ordering
the cessation of businesses using a long list of defense-related products.78 Yet, even their power was statutorily confined to matters that
“promote[d] the national defense.”79
73

Joshua Lenon, Are Lawyers Essential Workers in Your State?, CLIO (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.clio.com/blog/lawyers-essential-services/ [https://perma.cc/P3CR-N4HX] (listing state
exemptions for legal services). Notably, some jurisdictions indeed limited the legal services exception with the language “only when necessary to assist in compliance with legally mandated activities,” but most did not. Id.
74
See, e.g., Memorandum from Brandon Wales, Acting Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, at 19 (Dec. 16, 2020) https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ECIW_4.0_Guidance_on_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers_Final3_508_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UK95-RZD2] (recommending states treat as essential “media” and “lawyers” regardless of their specialty or function); Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-21 (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/executiveorder/pdf/2020-EO-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZR68-WTUD] (issuing a blanket “news media” exception); Guidance for Determining Whether a Business Enterprise is Subject to a Workforce Reduction Under Recent Executive
Orders, STATE OF N.Y. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://esd.ny.gov/guidance-executive-order-2026
[https://perma.cc/2TFB-4U4A] (same).
75
Memorandum from Brandon Wales, supra note 74; Guidance for Determining Whether a
Business Enterprise is Subject to a Workforce Reduction Under Recent Executive Orders, supra note
74.
76
Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85
Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,292 (Sept. 4, 2020).
77
Some states, like Pennsylvania, attempted to define “essential” more strictly, such as Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolfe’s broad closure order, which applied to all but “life-sustaining businesses.” See Order Regarding the Closure of All Businesses That are Not Life Sustaining,
COMMONWEALTH OF PA. § 1 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/20200319-TWW-COVID-19-business-closure-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XA4ZYAZP]. In practice, however, “life-sustaining” functioned synonymously with “essential.” See Josh
Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 651, 658, 690
(2021).
78
See, e.g., Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D. Ga. 1943) (upholding an order by the
Office of Price Administration barring plaintiff gas dealers from operating their business due to
rationing).
79
Act of May 31, 1941, 55 Stat. 236, 236.
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In short, COVID-19 business closure orders are not merely exercises of ordinary public health power, nor are they economic regulation
of a traditional kind. They apply, unlike the traditional measures of
quarantines and isolation, not to people and enterprises suspected of
being infected or potentially exposed, but to everyone. COVID-19 closures involve a far broader power to determine what work is worthwhile
to permit. Such an exercise of power will almost always be “reasonable”
given the lack of any standard for what is “essential,” and thus any constitutional check must involve a higher level of scrutiny.
IV. UNLOCKING LOCHNER—AND LIMITING IT
Recognizing what one might call a “little Lochner” interest in a
right to be free of bans on engaging in otherwise lawful vocations need
not reopen the door, closed in West Coast Hotel, to challenging state
economic regulation. The Fourteenth Amendment can limit state power
to engage in wholesale deprivations of people’s livelihoods without resurrecting Lochner itself. Thus, the liberty interest contemplated here
would be narrower than Lochner’s free-wheeling examinations of state
economic policy.
For example, a highly restrictive test for invoking such a liberty
interest would be to allow its invocation only against prohibitions on
work that are (1) categorical; (2) lack a basis in the historical and traditional uses of the police power in pandemic emergencies of comparable severity; and (3) do not necessarily deserve the great deference afforded to public health measures because they do not have a
particularized scientific rationale. The Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence frequently looks to what practices have won acceptance
with time as a limiting factor.80
The first factor would limit the use of “little Lochner” to orders
shuttering otherwise lawful businesses as a class, as opposed to imposing limits on their operations. This would bypass almost all economic
legislation without calling into doubt public health responses such as
social distancing requirements or occupancy and hours regulations. The
80

See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21(1997) (“Our established method
of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed
that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”) (citations omitted). To be sure,
over time new practices may displace older ones as touchstones of tradition, but it would be hard
to say the past eighteen months of COVID-19 response makes irrelevant the extent the government exercised authority in the past century of pandemic control measures, from the Spanish Flu
to H1N1. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (“We think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”). The more current the practice, the
harder it is to distinguish a genuine tradition from simply things that have happened. And the
1918–19 experience is particularly relevant because the public health threat was at least as great
as with COVID-19.
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second factor would prevent such substantive due process claims to be
used to raise the level of scrutiny of standard public health measures,
such as compulsory vaccination, quarantine and isolation, and the closure of mass gatherings and schools, all of which have been long-standing staples in the management of infectious diseases. It would, however,
allow courts to meaningfully scrutinize measures that have a broad and
dramatic impact, while going far beyond previously accepted or expected measures.
The third factor is crucial to both policing arbitrary exercises of
government authority and respecting the scientific judgements of public
health authorities. Many determinations about what businesses can remain open were not supported by an explicit scientific basis.81 For example, in one case, when asked what evidence supported closing certain
business but not others, one state official “could not point to any facts
in the record.”82 But it is clear that many of the determinations about
who is permitted to work also lack any individualized evidentiary or
scientific basis. Thus, the third factor should allay concerns about second-guessing expert determinations. In practice, it would mean that a
broad shutdown would be easier to constitutionally justify than one riddled with exceptions. The former could be justified by a high-level public
health determination that regular business must halt. That a broader
shut-down might be easier to sustain than one riddled with special interest exemptions makes sense, as refusing to grant such dispensations
is a political check on the use of shut-downs and confirms the exigency
of the public health situation.
Recognizing a limited liberty interest in pursuing one’s business
would provide some check against government overreach in time of crisis, and, in particular, against the extraordinary power of determining
what work is important. But it need not call into doubt public health
business closure orders and stay-at-home rules generally. The ability to
articulate such a right does not mean it would necessarily, or even commonly, lead to the invalidation of such measures. The existence of constitutional protection for religion did not stop courts from turning away
the majority of Free Exercise challenges to closure orders and social
distancing rules imposed on places of worship, especially during the
first months.83
A revival of a mini-Lochner doctrine would still be subject to the
deference to public health measures called for by Jacobson, which itself
81

See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 468 F. Supp. 3d 940, 950
(W.D. Mich. 2020), appeal dismissed, 843 F. App’x 707 (6th Cir. 2021).
83
See supra notes 9–11.
82
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involved a substantive due process claim. Government public health
measures have a strong presumption of validity under Jacobson, but
that is not the same as saying there is no individual rights basis on
which to challenge them. Jacobson sustained a municipal vaccination
requirement during a smallpox epidemic and was, until the COVID-19
pandemic, the Court’s principal pronouncement on balancing constitutional rights and public health measures. From the start of the pandemic, many have read Jacobson as standing for vast judicial deference
to public health measures taken to prevent the spread of a serious infectious disease.84 Some courts have read it even more broadly as condoning a suspension of constitutional liberties during a pandemic so
long as the health measures are not “pretext[ual].”85 Whatever the
soundness of these ideas, they certainly read too much into Jacobson.
Though Jacobson did have broad language about a society’s right to
brush away individual rights to protect itself, such language presaged
the Supreme Court’s notorious upholding of compulsory sterilization to
stop the “spread” of mental retardation.86 Buck v. Bell87 alone shows the
dangers of confusing Jacobson’s holding in light of its limited facts with
its broader musings about social self-defense.
On its facts, Jacobson was not dramatic. The public health threat
involved was in many ways greater than COVID-19: smallpox, a disease
far deadlier, and which particularly targeted children. But the governmental response was far more modest than in the current pandemic: it
required people to either be vaccinated or pay a one-time five-dollar
penalty (roughly $140 today).88 The plaintiff in Jacobson faced what
amounts to a parking ticket, and the case thus serves as, at most, a
limited precedent for today’s COVID-19 measures.89 Yet rights protected by the even the strictest scrutiny have received Jacobson treatment during the pandemic.
84

See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
85
See Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2020), aff’d, 990 F.3d 539 (7th
Cir. 2021).
86
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“[S]ociety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” (citing Jacobson)).
87
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
88
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 21 (1905). See also Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70, (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (questioning Jacobson’s
relevance to COVID shutdown orders by asking “what does that [a small fine] have to do with our
circumstances?”).
89
See Lasertron, Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 138 N.Y.S.3d 844, 851–52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2021) (“Jacobson is hardly the super-precedent that it is purported to be. The 1905 case addresses
a challenge to a state law that required residents to be vaccinated against smallpox or pay a $5
fine. The burden in Jacobson was fairly modest—either get vaccinated or pay a fine. Here, the
burden is unlimited, as the result is closure and the forfeiture of your business and livelihood.”).
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One important limitation in applying Jacobson to current COVID19 measures is that the former involved a single, discrete public health
measure with a well-elaborated scientific justification—vaccination.
The Court held that the efficacy of vaccination was “knowledge which,
it is safe to affirm, in common to all civilized peoples touching smallpox
and the methods most usually employed to eradicate that disease.”90
This leaves open the possibility that more particular measures, such as
not allowing outdoor dining in restaurants but only in film catering
tents, that may not be as universally obvious or widely practiced, could
be open to challenge.
Valid concerns about courts’ relative lack of expertise are reflected
in an extremely forgiving standard of review, not in entirely insulating
such measures from challenge. Moreover, allowing such challenges to
measures would not substitute courts’ judgements for those of medical
experts but rather check whether there is any particularized scientific
determination behind the restriction.91 Courts have repeatedly noted
that government closure orders are not necessarily based on “science,”
as evidenced by governmental defendants occasional inability to articulate reasons for some closure orders92—and these are exactly the kind
of measures a “little Lochner” would target.
Courts already scrutinize the necessity and arbitrariness of
COVID-19 measures as applied to abortion clinic restrictions, gun
shops, travel restrictions, and protests. In some of these cases,93 they
have even found that the challenged policies impermissibly infringe on
constitutional rights. Such a finding typically includes at least an implicit determination that the measure was not absolutely vital for public
safety. If public health restrictions can be arbitrary when they affect
churches and abortion clinics, there is no reason to think they may not
be arbitrary when they affect people’s ability to work while sweeping
far more broadly than typical paternalistic economic regulations.
It has become clear in the past year that courts do not abdicate
their responsibility of judicial review simply because challenged
measures have a public health justification.94 Courts have even struck
90

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
See, e.g., Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, 496 F. Supp. 3d 284, 299 (D.D.C. 2020)
(noting that the city “marshaled no scientific evidence” to sustain certain closure rules and distinctions, and that what it had put forth would fail to satisfy Daubert evidentiary test for admissibility
of scientific expertise).
92
See Lasertron, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 851 (“Respondents could not (or would not) answer why certain indoor activities were permitted and others, like Lasertron, were not.”).
93
See cases cited supra notes 9–15.
94
See, e.g., Laserton, 138 N.Y.S.3d at 851 (“While it is understood that recommendations of
those in the public health field should be given considerable weight, this does not mean that carte
blanche is generously given to governmental authorities without redress or review.”)
91
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down measures with purported public health justifications not only on
individual rights grounds, but even on more inchoate structural constitutional grounds.95 Thus a “little Lochner” would not represent some
new supremacy of judges over health determinations. It would simply
recognize that perhaps the most important human impact of such
measures on people’s autonomy falls in the broad powers exercised over
their ability to work.
V.

CONCLUSION

The extraordinarily broad restrictions on business imposed during
the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the extraordinary power governments can exercise over individuals’ lives by preventing them from
making a livelihood and deciding who does get to work. Despite the revival of substantive due process as a constitutional doctrine in the 1960s,
liberty interests involving work are commonly thought to be outside the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of the repudiation of
the Lochner doctrine. This Essay has shown that a closer examination
of the reasons behind the abandonment of Lochner demonstrate that,
even under current precedents, substantive due process challenges to
unprecedently broad business closures should remain viable under certain circumstances, especially when such measures regulate people’s
ability to work but are not based on any particular view of economic
policy. As a positive matter, the sheer scope of government control of
livelihoods in the name of public health suggests some such liberty interest should be recognized, even if it currently is not. It would be paradoxical for courts to police various commonplace incursions into people’s autonomy yet leave perhaps the largest interference outside the
scope of constitutional protection.
This is not to say that business closures in a pandemic should not
enjoy the same high presumption of validity as other public health
measures. Certainly, they should, especially at the height of an emergency. But this Essay argues that such a presumption should not be
absolute and should yield to liberty interests in some circumstances.
Judicial scrutiny will be most valuable when dealing with broad and
novel assertions of power.
The ability to assert a mini-Lochner right in such circumstances
would provide is some layer of judicial safeguard against closure
95

See, e.g., Skyworks, Ltd. v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 5:20-CV-2407, 2021
WL 911720, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2021) (holding that CDC eviction moratorium exceeded the
agency’s statutorily delegated powers, and noting that a contrary conclusion would “implicate serious constitutional concerns”), order clarified, No. 5:20-CV-2407, 2021 WL 2228676 (N.D. Ohio
June 3, 2021); Terkel v. CDC, No. 6:20-CV-00564, 2021 WL 742877, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25,
2021) (holding that CDC moratorium on residential evictions to avoid spreading COVID exceeded
federal government’s enumerated powers).
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measures whose impact on the lives of Americans—and on their ability
to exercise autonomy—may far exceed, in practical effect, the burdens
to religious or reproductive rights.96 Even with a limited right of the
kind described here, the relevant public health measures would enjoy
the strongest presumption of validity. Yet courts have also recognized
that, during the pandemic, states have issued regulations that are arbitrary,97 excessive, and lack even a purported scientific basis.

96

Given the U.S. system of purely negative rights, neither the right to congregate in prayer,
to read a newspaper, have an abortion, nor carry a firearm in self-defense have practical value
without the money to build and maintain houses of worship, subscribe to new sources, and pay for
a gun or an abortion.
97
For example, Michigan deemed hardware stores essential, unless they sell paint or mulch.
See Blackman, supra note 77, at 643 (describing the classification as “unreasonable”). Other states
included landscaping and nurseries in list of essential businesses. See, e.g., Memorandum from the
Maryland Office of Legal Counsel 12(b)(ii) (Mar. 23, 2020) https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OLC-Interpretive-Guidance-COVID19-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/728L-5677].

